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A number of recent studies have documented the growth of earnings inequality 
in the United  States during the  1980s (see, eg,  Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
1993: Katz and Murphy  1992; Blackbum, Bloom, and Freeman  1990: and 
Bound and Johnson  1992). The most salient characteristics of the growth in 
earnings inequality in the United States are (1) the increase in the relative earn- 
ings of more educated workers, (2) the pronounced increase in the earnings of 
older workers relative to  younger workers among those without college de- 
grees, and (3) the increase in earnings inequality  within education and age 
groups. Some recent studies have shown an increase in  earnings inequality 
along  similar  dimensions in  other industrialized  countries (Gottschalk  and 
Joyce 1992; Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, chap. 1 in this volume; Davis 
1992: Green, Coder, and Ryscavage 1992). 
In this paper, we examine trends in earnings inequality in the former West 
Germany. Although we do not present new evidence on earnings trends in the 
United States, we make frequent reference to findings from other researchers’ 
analyses of U.S. data in an effort to understand the notable differences between 
the trends that we document for Germany and those that have been documented 
for the United States. 
Most research by German scholars on the structure of wages has focused on 
intersectoral and interregional wage differentials, although there has been some 
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analysis of  earnings differentials  across industrial workers  in different broad 
occupation groups. There is clear evidence that  wage differentials along all 
these dimensions narrowed  between  1950 and the mid-1960s but that wage 
differentials generally remained stable or even increased slightly between the 
mid-1960s and the late  1970s or early  1980s (Thiehoff  1987; Franke  1983; 
Vogler-Ludwig 1985). Analyses of the relative incomes of workers with differ- 
ent qualifications include Blossfeld (1984) and Bellman and Buttler  (1989). 
Both postulated that the expansion of higher education in Germany beginning 
in the early  1970s might have led to a fall in the relative earnings of  highly 
educated workers. Their findings concerning trends in the relative incomes of 
labor market entrants with different qualifications are generally consistent with 
this hypothesis. 
Our study is modeled on the analyses that have documented the growing 
inequality of earnings in the United States during the 1980s and sought expla- 
nations for that growth. In contrast to recent trends in the United States, and in 
contrast to the conclusions drawn from much sketchier data by Davis (1992) 
and  Green, Coder,  and Ryscavage (1  9921,  we find virtually  no evidence of 
growth in earnings inequality in Germany in recent years.' Our analysis of two 
micro-data sets shows that the overall dispersion of earnings in Germany in- 
stead has narrowed somewhat, primarily because earnings differentials among 
workers in the bottom half of the earnings distribution have narrowed. We find 
little evidence of widening earnings differentials across skill groups, rough sta- 
bility in the relative earnings of more and less educated workers, no evidence 
of  a general  widening of differentials  across age groups, and no consistent 
evidence of widening differentials within either education or age groups. 
In trying to explain the widely  divergent  trends in earnings inequality in 
Germany and the United States, we consider the effects that various factors 
may have had. Institutional differences between the German and the U.S. wage- 
setting processes probably contributed to the quite different trends in earnings 
inequality  in the two countries. We conclude, however, that German  wage- 
setting institutions, which we suspect do tend  to limit earnings differentials 
across groups of workers, cannot on their own explain the different pattern of 
wage changes in Germany compared with the United States. Different trends 
in the supply of  more highly educated workers in the two countries may help 
explain why the returns to education grew dramatically in the United States 
during the 1980s but narrowed in Germany over that period. In addition, insti- 
tutional differences in the two countries'  education systems may have contrib- 
uted to the different trends in wage inequality that have been observed. German 
youths who do not attend college arguably receive better general training than 
their U.S. counterparts, with the result that shifts in relative demand and supply 
1. The numbers reported for Germany by both Davis (1992) and Green, Coder, and Ryscavage 
(1992) come from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and refer only to 1981 and 1984. Different 
surveys underlie the 1981 and  1984 LIS numbers. In addition, it turns out to be misleading to 
extrapolate from changes in the distribution of  income observed over the period 1981-84. 373  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
produce smaller changes in relative marginal products, and thus relative wages, 
in Germany than in the United States. 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. Section 11.1 presents 
evidence on trends in earnings inequality in Germany in recent years. Section 
11.2 examines the potential influences of  wage-setting institutions, demand 
and supply factors, and the structure of the education system on trends in Ger- 
man earnings inequality. Our findings and conclusions are summarized in sec- 
tion 11.3. 
11.1  Trends in Earnings Inequality in Germany 
We draw from several different data sources in our analysis of trends in wage 
inequality in Germany. The first is an establishment survey that collects infor- 
mation for the industrial sector on the compensation of  workers in each of 
seven occupation groups. We also make extensive use of micro data from social 
security earnings records and from the German Socioeconomic Panel, both of 
which are described in greater detail below. 
The Survey of Compensation in Industry and Trade (Verdiensterhebung in 
Industrie und Handel) is of interest primarily because it provides the longest 
available time  series on  the relative earnings of  workers  in  different  skill 
groups. The survey yields data for blue- and white-collar workers employed at 
establishments with ten  or more employees in manufacturing, mining, con- 
struction, and utilities. Employers responding to the survey report earnings sep- 
arately for men and women in each of three blue-collar and four white-collar 
job categories. The job categories for which data are reported and their approx- 
imate shares of  covered employment in  1986 are as follows: unskilled blue- 
collar jobs (BCl), 12 percent; semiskilled blue-collar jobs (BC2), 24 percent; 
skilled blue-collar jobs (BC3), 35 percent; white-collar positions requiring no 
vocational  training  (WCl),  1  percent;  junior  supervisory  staff  positions 
(WC2), 5 percent; foremen’s or supervisory positions (WC3), 14 percent; and 
middle-management positions (WC4), 10 percent (Fels and Gundlach 1990). 
Data for top executives are not reported, and respondents are asked to report 
earnings in each of the included occupation categories only for full-time work- 
ers who are not apprentices.2  We use tabulations of mean weekly (blue collar) 
or monthly (white collar) earnings by sex and occupation group from this sur- 
vey published by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches B~ndesamt).~ 
2. Data from another survey, the 1978 Wage and Salary Structure Survey (Gehalts- und Lohns- 
trukturerhebung  1978). indicate that the excluded top management category accounts for only 
about 1 percent of industrial employment. Part-timers account for about 5 percent of industrial em- 
ployment. 
3. The individual establishment reports from this survey are not available for use by researchers. 
Data on blue-collar workers come from Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie  16: Liihne  und Ge- 
halter, Reihe 2.  l;  Arbeiterverdienste in der Industrie (Wiesbaden) and data on white-collar workers 
from Fachserie 16:  Liihne und Gehalter; Reihe 2.2: Angestelltenverdienste in Industrie und  Han- 
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Figure 11.1 shows trends in the relative earnings of  blue- and white-collar 
workers by  skill group over the period 1964-89.  Figure 11.1~  displays trends 
in relative earnings for men; figure 11.  lb  displays trends for women.4  Particu- 
larly for men, the ratio of  white-collar to blue-collar earnings appears some- 
what cyclically sensitive, rising during recessions and falling during upturns. 
This reflects the cyclic sensitivity of blue-collar workers’ weekly hours. Since 
the late  1970s, again particularly among men, the earnings of  white-collar 
workers have increased somewhat relative to the earnings of blue-collar work- 
ers. These changes in relative earnings are, however, not large; only the earn- 
ings of the most skilled male white-collar workers were notably higher relative 
to the earnings of men in other groups in 1989 than they had been in 1975. 
A major limitation of the Verdiensterhebung in Industrie und Handel is that 
only average earnings for workers in broadly defined occupational groups are 
collected. In order to draw a more detailed picture of recent trends in the distri- 
bution of earnings across individual workers in Germany, we use two micro- 
data sets. The first contains social security data housed with the Federal Em- 
ployment Service (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit). The social security data cover 
all workers included in the social security system; the major exclusions are 
government workers and the self-employed.  These exclusions are of  some sig- 
nificance because a large share of highly educated Germans work in the public 
sector. The share of  all dependent employees covered by  the social security 
system is close to 90 percent, but comparisons between data from the German 
Mikrozensus (a household survey) and data from social security records re- 
ported by Clement, Tessaring, and Weisshuhn (1980) indicate that only about 
one-third of  employed university  (Hochschule) graduates and two-thirds of 
employed technical college (Fachhochschule) graduates were in covered em- 
ployment in 1978. Social security records include information on gross earn- 
ings subject to the social security tax, gender, educational qualifications, and 
birth date. They also contain information on whether an individual worked 
full-time or part-time and on the share of the year that the individual worked. 
The Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit generally does not allow outside researchers 
direct access to the social security data. We  were given special tabulations 
based on a longitudinal sample used by  researchers there. This longitudinal 
data set was constructed by  sampling randomly from the population of  men 
who paid social security taxes in any year from 1976 through  1984 and in- 
cludes a record for each selected man for each year in which he held a covered 
Our tabulations report the number of persons with annualized social secu- 
rity earnings in thousand-deutsche-mark (DM) increments for full-time (al- 
4. To  calculate the reported white-collar/blue-collar ratios, the weekly earnings of  blue-collar 
workers were multiplied by 4.3 to make them comparable to the monthly white-collar earnings. 
5.  The method used to construct the longitudinal data file is such that the sample of records for 
each year should be representative of all men in covered employment in that year. Because of an 
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Fig. 11.1  Relative earnings trends 
though not necessarily full-year) male workers, by  education and age.6 The 
sample size in each year is about fifty-five thousand persons. These tabulations 
allow us to approximate earnings by education and age at various percentiles 
of the earnings distribution.' 
The major limitation of the social security data is that reported earnings are 
truncated at the social security taxation threshold. The earnings cutoff varies 
from year to year. Except in 1976 and 1977, fewer than 10 percent of sampled 
workers have censored earnings, but censoring is more of a problem for the 
most educated and the oldest subgroups in the data set. In most years, more 
than half of Hochschule graduates had earnings in excess of the social security 
maximum, and we were therefore unable to approximate median earnings for 
6. Annualized earnings were created by dividing a person's  total social security earnings during 
a year by his days of  employment in that year, then multiplying the resulting daily earnings figure 
by 365. 
7. We approximated the median by interpolation as El + [(OSO -  Pl)/(P2 -  Pl)] X (E2 - 
El), where El is the level of earnings at the lower boundary of the cell containing the median, E2 
is the level of earnings at the upper boundary of the cell containing the median, P1 is the share of 
persons with earnings in cells below the cell containing the median, and P2 is the share of persons 
with earnings either in the cell containing the median or in a lower cell. Similar calculations were 
made to identify the ninetieth percentile and the tenth percentile of earnings. 376  Katharine G.  Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
this group. For the same reason, we were unable to approximate the 1976 me- 
dian earnings of  Fachhochschule graduates. In addition, it was impossible to 
construct an estimate of  earnings at the ninetieth percentile of  the earnings 
distribution for Fachhuchschule  graduates, Huchschule  graduates, persons 
aged forty to forty-nine, persons aged fifty to fifty-nine, or persons aged sixty 
and older in any year. 
The second micro-data set that we use is the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP), which is similar to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. A 95 per- 
cent sample drawn from the data set is available to non-German researchers. 
The panel was begun in 1984 and covers about five thousand households. We 
report data on average monthly earnings for the years from  1983 (interview 
year 1984) through 1989, the year prior to German reunification, and the sam- 
ple used for this paper covers only households in the former West Germany.* 
Foreigners are oversampled relative to their share of the population. We  there- 
fore used sample weights when calculating basic summary statistics with these 
data. The GSOEP includes information on average gross monthly earnings, 
other pay  such as thirteenth- and fourteenth-month pay  and holiday allow- 
ance~,~  gender, nationality, birth year, type of secondary education, and univer- 
sity or occupation qualification. The earnings measure that we report for the 
GSOEP is average monthly earnings plus one-twelfth of any thirteenth-month 
pay, fourteenth-month pay, or holiday allowances received during the calendar 
year preceding the survey interview.’O All our analysis has been replicated us- 
ing pay  in the month prior to the survey interview in place of  the earnings 
measure just described. None of our results is sensitive to the earnings measure 
used. Unlike the social security earnings measure, the GSOEP earnings mea- 
sures are neither reported by intervals nor truncated at an upper threshold. Fur- 
thermore, whereas the social security data are limited to full-time, covered 
employment but  include part-year employees, the GSOEP sample that  we 
study is not restricted to employment covered by the social security system but 
includes only full-time, full-year workers. For these reasons, figures from the 
social security data and the GSOEP data are not strictly comparable. 
Table 11.1 presents trends in the overall distribution of  German earnings 
from the social security and the GSOEP data. The reported numbers based on 
the social security data, which appear in the table’s top panel, show the ratios 
8. We have updated our analysis of the GSOEP data on households in the former West Germany 
through 1991. The basic trends in the GSOEP data documented for the 1980s also are apparent in 
the early 1990s. 
9. It is common practice for German employers to give their employees a lump-sum payment in 
the amount of one to two months’ pay at the end of the calendar year. This pay is termed thirteenth- 
month orfourteenth-month  pay, as appropriate. The amount of  such pay commonly is specified in 
the applicable collective bargaining agreement. 
10. Persons with implausibly low earnings (less than DM 500 per month) or implausibly high 
earnings (anyone in the upper tail of the earnings distribution whose average monthly earnings 
were grossly out of line with the average monthly earnings reported by  the same individual in 
other years) were excluded from the sample. In all years, these exclusions reduced the size of our 
sample by less than 1 percent. 377  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
Table 11.1  Trends in the Distribution of Earnings in Germany 
Earnings Ratios for Male 
Full-Time Workersa 
90tM10th  90tN50th  50thJ10th 









...  ...  1.49 
...  ...  1.52 
2.24  1.48  1.51 
2.19  1.46  1.50 
2.18  1.46  1.49 
2.18  1.46  1  SO 
2.19  1.50  1.46 
2.23  1.52  1.47 
Earnings Ratios for Male Full-Time, 
Full-Year Workersb 
1983  2.62  1.72  1.52 
1984  2.60  1.71  1.52 
198.5  2.50  1.73  1.45 
1986  2.53  1.73  1.47 
1987  2.45  1.73  1.41 
1988  2.43  1.69  1.44 
1989  2.41  1.72  1.40 
Earnings Ratios for All Full-Time, 
Full-Year Workersb 
1983  2.80  1.72  1.63 
1984  2.99  1.73  1.73 
1985  2.72  1.73  1.57 
1986  2.63  1.71  1.54 
1987  2.61  1.73  1.51 
1988  2.53  1.68  1.51 
1989  2.58  1.72  1  SO 
"Authors' calculations  using social security earnings data. The underlying numbers are annualized 
earnings for all men who worked full-time for any part of  the year. In both 1976 and 1977, the 
ninetieth percentile of  the distribution of annualized earnings fell above the maximum earnings 
subject to social security tax and thus was not observed in these data. 
bAuthors' calculations using German Socioeconomic  Panel data. The underlying numbers are av- 
erage monthly earnings for either the male or the total population of full-time, full-year workers. 
of the ninetiethhenth, the ninetiethlfiftieth, and the fiftiethhenth percentile lev- 
els of earnings for full-time male workers over the period 1976-83. As already 
indicated, we were unable to calculate the ninetieth percentile level of earnings 
for either  1976 or  1977. The numbers in the table's bottom two panels are 
based on the GSOEP data and show the same ratios for male full-time, full- 
year workers and for all full-time, full-year workers over the period 1983-89. 
The most striking finding to emerge from this table is the absence of  in- 378  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
creased  dispersion  in  the  overall  distribution  of  earnings  over  either  the 
1978-83 or 1983-89  period. In the social security data for 1978-83, the ratio 
of the earnings of males at the ninetieth percentile of the earnings distribution 
to the earnings of males at the fiftieth percentile rose slightly, and the ratio of 
the earnings of males at the fiftieth percentile to the earnings of males at the 
tenth percentile fell  slightly, leaving  the  90-1 0 differential  essentially  un- 
changed. The GSOEP numbers suggest that, both for males and for males and 
females combined, the 90-50  differential was roughly constant between 1983 
and  1989 but that the 50-10  differential fell by  about 8 percent  so that the 
differential between the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles of the earnings dis- 
tribution also fell. 
Our finding of narrowing differentials at the bottom of the earnings distribu- 
tion is similar to that reported for France in Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower 
(chap. 1 in this volume) and is in striking contrast to trends in the United States 
in the  1980s. In the United States, the earnings of those at the bottom of the 
distribution fell both in absolute real terms and relative to the rest of the work- 
force. In Germany, the real earnings of all groups were rising, and the least- 
well-paid workers were gaining on the rest of the workforce. 
In the United States, the dramatic rise in earnings differentials across educa- 
tion groups is an important part of  the overall growth in earnings inequality. 
Before looking at trends in earnings differentials by education group in Ger- 
many, we provide a brief description of the basic structure of the German edu- 
cation system. As shown in figure 11.2, German youths enter school at age six 
and typically  spend  four years at  a  Grundschule or neighborhood  primary 
school. At age ten, they must choose to attend one of three types of secondary 
school: a Huuptschule, a Reulschule, or a Gymnasium. 
The Huuptschule cumculum generally takes about five years to complete 
and  prepares  students for apprenticeships in  the  trades,  semiskilled  office 
work, retail sales, or domestic services. The typical apprenticeship lasts three 
years, with apprentices spending roughly a day a week at a Berufschule or part- 
time vocational school. The Reulschule  curriculum takes about six years to 
complete and prepares students either for further vocational secondary school- 
ing or  for apprenticeships in higher-level occupations. Those who graduate 
from a full-time vocational secondary school, in turn, may qualify for atten- 
dance at a Fuchhochscule. Fuchhochschulen offer cumcula similar to those in 
applied fields at U.S. universities. Those who successfully complete the nine- 
year course of study and subsequent examinations at a Gymnasium receive an 
Abitul; a certificate that qualifies them for enrollment at a Hochschule or uni- 
versity. It is possible to obtain a Hochschule degree in as little as five years, 
although the typical student takes longer. While most of those who receive the 
Abitur enroll in postsecondary education, a significant and growing minority 
choose instead to enter an apprenticeship. 
In the social security data that we use to examine trends in relative earnings 
over the period  1976-83, workers are classified into five qualification groups. 379  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
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Fig. 11.2  The German education system 
Source; Adapted from Teichler and Sanyal (1982). 
Because of  data limitations, we  use earnings information for only three of 
these groups in our by-education-level analysis: (1) persons with no occupa- 
tional qualification, a group that includes Hauptschule and Realschule gradu- 
ates who did not complete an apprenticeship or graduate from a full-time voca- 
tional secondary school; (2) persons with an occupational qualification, which 
might be either a completed apprenticeship or graduation from a full-time VO- 
cational secondary school; and (3) Fachhochschule graduates." Our tabula- 
tions of GSOEP data for the period 1983-89 make use of earnings information 
for three groups: (1) persons with no occupational qualification; (2)  persons 
with an occupational qualification, most typically completion of an apprentice- 
ship; and  (3) persons who  graduated from  either  a  Fachhochschule  or  a 
Hochschule.  l2 
11. The remaining two groups were Hochschule graduates and persons holding an Abifur  but 
having no other qualification. The earnings of  Hochschule graduates frequently exceeded the so- 
cial security maximum and thus were truncated; the number of people holding an Abitur but pos- 
sessing no other qualification is small. 
12. The survey questionnaire contains more detailed questions concerning respondents' educa- 
tional and training background, but sample sizes for more disaggregated groups were too small to 380  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
Table 11.2 presents trends in German earnings by education from the social 
security and GSOEP data. The ratios presented in this table were calculated 
using the median earnings for each education group. As already noted, we were 
unable to calculate the median earnings for Hochschule graduates for most 
years covered by the social security data, and we were also unable to compute 
1976 median  earnings for  Fachhochschule graduates. Because those  with 
Hochschule and Fachhochschule degrees are grouped together in the tabula- 
tions based on the GSOEP data, we would have preferred to report social secu- 
rity medians for Fachhochschule and Hochschule graduates together, but, be- 
cause  of  the  truncation  problems  already  discussed,  the  median  for  this 
combined category could be approximated for only three years. 
Table 11.2 shows no general widening of earnings differentials across educa- 
tion groups since the mid-1970s. The social security data in the top panel of 
the table indicate that, over the period 1977-83,  the relative earnings of those 
with a Fachhochschule degree rose slightly relative to both those with no qual- 
ification and those with an occupational qualification, but the GSOEP data in 
the second and third panel indicate that these trends were at least partially 
reversed during the period 1983-89. The social security data suggest that there 
was a slight decline in the earnings of those with an occupational qualification 
relative to those with no qualification between 1976 and  1983; the relative 
earnings of workers in these two groups also declined between 1983 and 1989. 
Another prominent feature of the growth in earnings inequality in the United 
States has been the widening of experience- and age-related earnings differen- 
tials. The German figures reported in table 11.3 show no comparable widening 
of differences in earnings across age groups. Although the social security data 
reveal some increase in the earnings of workers aged forty and older relative 
to workers aged twenty to twenty-nine over the period  1976-83,  the GSOEP 
data suggest that this increase was largely reversed during the mid-1980s. The 
earnings of persons aged thirty to thirty-nine rose at the same pace as the earn- 
ings of those aged twenty to twenty-nine between 1976 and 1983, but the earn- 
ings advantage of thirty- to thirty-nine-year-olds  was eroded between 1983 and 
1989. If  any general conclusion can be drawn from the evidence on median 
earnings by age group, it is that age-related earnings differentials in Germany 
have been relatively stable or have narrowed since the mid-1970s. 
While widening education and age differentials are important features of the 
growth in overall inequality observed in the United States, the dispersion of 
earnings within education and age groups has also widened there. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the patterns of  change in the distribution of German earn- 
ings that we have already documented, there does not appear to have been a 
comparable widening of within-group dispersion in earnings in Germany. Ta- 
support meaningful analyses. Sample size considerations also dictated grouping Hochschule and 
Fachhochschule graduates. Persons with an Abitur but no other qualification were assigned to a 
fourth category that does not appear in our by-education-level tabulations. Table 11.2  Tkends in Earnings by Education in Germany 
Earnings Ratios for Male Full-Time Workersa 
Occupational  Fachhochschulel 
Fachhochschulel  Qualification/  Occupational 






























1  .50 
Earnings Ratios for Male Full-Time, Full-Year Workersh 
Hochschule or 
Fachhochschulel  Qualification/  Occupational 
No Qualification  No Qualification  Qualification 





























Earnings Ratios for All Full-Time, Full-Year Workersb 
Hochschule or  Occupational 
Fachhochschulel  Qualification/ 

































"Ratios of  median earnings for each of the two indicated education groups, based on authors' 
calculations using social security earnings data. The underlying numbers are annualized earnings 
for all men who worked full-time for any part of the year. In  1976, the median of the distribution 
of annualized earnings for Fachhochschule graduates exceeded the maximum earnings subject to 
social security tax and thus was not observed in these data. 
bRatios of median earnings for each of  the two indicated education groups, based  on authors' 
calculations  using  German  Socioeconomic  Panel  data.  The  underlying  numbers  are  average 
monthly earnings for either the male or the total population of full-time, full-year workers. 382  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
Table 11.3  Trends in Earnings by Age Group in Germany 
Earnings Ratios for Male Full-Time Workersa 









































Earnings Ratios for Male Full-Time, Full-Year Workersb 
30-39120-29  40-49120-29  50-59120-29  6Oil20-29 
1983  1.35  1.45  1.34  1.35 
1984  1.30  1.41  1.31  1.30 
1985  1.30  1.38  1.26  I .36 
1986  1.28  1.35  1.29  1.35 
1987  1.25  1.40  1.24  1.27 
1988  1.26  1.42  1.27  1.29 
1989  1.22  1.40  1.28  1.20 
Earnings Ratios for All Full-Time, Full-Year Workersb 
30-39120-29  40-49/20-29  50-59120-29  60+/20-29 
1983  1.36  1.43  1.39  1.36 
1984  1.36  1.42  1.38  1.38 
1985  1.33  1.39  1.33  1.47 
1986  1.36  I .43  1.36  1.45 
1987  1.27  1.40  1.26  1.33 
1988  1.29  1.44  1.30  1.32 
1989  1.25  1.38  1.29  1.28 
"Ratios of median earnings for each of the two indicated age groups, based on authors' calculations 
using social security earnings data. The underlying numbers are annualized earnings for all men 
who worked full-time for any part of the year. 
bRatios  of median earnings for each of the two indicated age groups, based on authors' calculations 
using German Socioeconomic Panel data. The underlying numbers are average monthly earnings 
for either the male or the total population of  full-time, full-year workers. 
ble 11.4 reports annual values of the 90-10  differential for selected education 
groups; table  11.5 reports the same statistic for selected age groups. These 
differentials exhibit no consistent trend over the period 1976-83  and, if any- 
thing, have fallen over the period 1983-89. 
One question that might be raised about the figures presented thus far is 383  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
whether the patterns that they reveal are an artifact of changes in the composi- 
tion of  particular education or age groups. One way  to address this question 
would be to prepare similar tabulations for groups defined using information 
on a larger number of characteristics (e.g., both education and age). Our ability 
to do this is limited. We have, however, used the GSOEP to fit a set of standard 
earnings regressions, one for each year, that allow us to examine how the re- 
turns to various individual characteristics have  changed over time. in table 
11.6, we report the results of this analysis only for the odd-numbered years in 
order to conserve space.13  in these regressions, the dependent variable is the 
log of average monthly earnings (including one-twelfth of  thirteenth-month, 
fourteenth-month, and holiday pay). The models include two sets of education 
and training dummies, one intended to capture an individual’s occupational 
preparation and the other to capture his or her secondary school background. 
The first set of education and training measures includes dummy variables for 
Hochschule  and Fachhochschule  graduates, for those with an occupational 
qualification, and for those with some other educational qualification; the omit- 
ted category includes those with no occupational qualification. The second set 
includes dummies for completion of  the Abitul; graduation from a vocational 
secondary  school,  graduation  from  a  Realschule,  graduation  from  a 
Hauptschule, and completion of  some other secondary cumculum (this in- 
volves mostly foreigners); the omitted category includes persons with no com- 
pleted secondary education. The model also includes age and age squared 
along with a dummy variable for females, interactions between the female 
dummy and the age terms, and a dummy variable for foreigners. 
While  the coefficient on  the  dummy variable  for  Hochschule  or Fach- 
hochschule  degree remains fairly constant over time, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for those with a vocational qualification drops by over 40 per- 
cent between  1983 and  1989. The implied decline in the return to having a 
vocational qualification is consistent with the tabulations reported in table 11.2 
above, and also with the narrowing of earnings differentials in the bottom half 
of  the  earnings distribution between  1983 and  1989 shown  in  table  11.1 
above.14 Consistent with the findings reported in table 11.3 above, the results 
of  table  11.6 also imply that age-related earnings differences declined over 
this period. 
11.2  Alternative Explanations 
One possible explanation for why earnings differentials have not grown in 
Germany as they have in the United States is that the solidaristic wage policies 
13. The coefficients from earnings regressions for the even-numbered years depict trends similar 
to those reported. 
14. The coefficient on the “other occupational training” dummy variable also drops dramati- 
cally, although it is hard to interpret this finding. The sample in this category is small, and the drop 
may be due to a change in the composition of workers in it. 384  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
Table 11.4  Trends in the Distribution of Earnings for Selected Education 
Groups in Germany 
Ratios of the 90th to the 10th Percentile of Earnings for Male Full-Time 
Workers" 
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'The  reported ratios are based on authors'  calculations using social security earnings data. The 
underlying numbers are annualized earnings for all men who worked full-time for any part of the 
year. Ratios are not reported for cases in which earnings at the ninetieth percentile of the earnings 
distribution exceeded the maximum earnings subject to social security tax and thus were not ob- 
served in these data. 
bThe reported ratios are based on authors' calculations using German Socioeconomic Panel data. 
The underlying numbers are average monthly earnings for either the male or the total population 
of full-time, full-year workers. 385  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
Table 11.5  Trends in the Distribution of Earnings for Selected Age Groups in 
Germany 
Ratios of the 90th to the 10th Percentile of Earnings for Male Full-Time 
Workers’ 





















































































~~  ~~~ 
@The  reported ratios are based on authors’ calculations using social security earnings data  The 
underlying numbers are annualized earnings for all men who worked full-time for any part of the 
year Ratios are not reported for cases in which earnings at the ninetieth percentile of the earnings 
distribution exceeded the maximum earnings subject to social secunty tax and thus were not ob- 
served in these data 
The  reported ratios are based on authors’ calculations using German Socioeconomc Panel data 
The underlying numbers are average monthly earnings for either the male or the total population 
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Table 11.6  Trends in the Returns to Education and Age in Germany: Dependent 
Variable, log (avg. monthly earnings) 
1983  1985  1987  1989 
HOCHSCHULEFACHHOCHSCHULE  DEGREE 
VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATON (Yes = 1) 
OTHER OCCUPATIONAL  TRAINING (Yes = 1) 
GYMNASIUM/ABITUR (Yes = 1) 
VOCATIONAL SECONDARY SCHOOL 
REALSCHULE (Yes = 1) 
HAUPTSCHCTLE (Yes = 1) 
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(Yes = 1) 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
pursued by German trade unions constrain the behavior of relative wages. A 
second hypothesis is that the very different evolution of relative earnings in the 
two countries reflects differences in demand and supply conditions. Finally, the 
relative stability of earnings differentials in Germany might reflect the stronger 
general training received by German youths who do not attend college, which 
arguably  makes  workers  with  different  levels  of  education  and  experience 
closer substitutes in Germany than  in the United  States. We consider these 
explanations in turn. 387  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
I 1.2.1  Wage-Setting Institutions 
Differences in German and US.  wage-setting institutions offer an appealing 
potential explanation for the divergent trends in earnings inequality in the two 
countrie~.~~  German unions generally have pursued what has been termed a 
solidaristic wage policy. At times, they have sought to narrow the gap between 
highly paid and less highly paid workers. More typically, they have  sought 
uniform percentage increases in wages for all workers. In a period when mar- 
ket forces would dictate growing differentials in wage rates by  ski11 level, these 
policies seem likely to limit any increase in the dispersion of wages that would 
otherwise occur. 
Because of the importance of the collective bargaining system in Germany, 
union wage policies are likely to have a substantial impact on the overall struc- 
ture  of  German  wages.  Most  German  workers  are  covered  by  collective 
agreements. In  contrast to the highly  decentralized process by  which U.S. 
workers’ wages are determined, German wages are determined by fairly cen- 
tralized collective bargaining between unions and employers’ associations. Be- 
tween 35 and 40 percent of German workers are union members. Unlike the 
situation in the United States, union representation in Germany has not fallen 
over the past two decades (see Freeman 1989). Moreover, roughly 90 percent 
of workers are employed by firms that belong to an employers’ association. 
Collective agreements most typically cover workers in a particular industry 
and Land (state).16 
Nonunion members employed in a company that belongs to an employers’ 
association also are likely to benefit from collective bargaining. Although the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement between a union and an employers’ 
association are binding only with respect to the wages and working conditions 
offered to union members employed by  members of  the employers’ associa- 
tion, employers almost universally choose to treat union members and non- 
members alike. 
Even workers in companies that do not belong to an employers’ association 
may be covered by a collective agreement. If a contract covers at least half the 
workforce in a particular sector and region, and if the minister of labor and 
social affairs determines that there is a compelling public interest that the con- 
tract be generally binding, the contract may be extended to cover employers 
who are not members of  the employers’ association. Although only about 4 
percent of all pay agreements are extended (see Lindena and Hohmann 1989), 
15. The following discussion of German wage-setting institutions draws heavily on both Bran- 
des, Meyer, and  Schudlich (1991) and Paque (n.d.), both of  which provide further details. The 
interpretation of the likely consequences of these institutions that we offer is ours, not theirs. 
16. Contracts in  some industries are national in  scope, while others cover geographic areas 
smaller than a Land. In addition, there are many single-employer bargaining units, although most 
are small; these units together account for only about 6 percent of covered workers. 388  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
virtually all employers choose to comply with the terms of the contract in their 
industry and region. This may reflect, in part, the threat of a formal contract ex- 
tension. 
Unlike  collective bargaining  agreements in  the  United  States, German 
agreements set only a floor on wages and working conditions. Any employer 
is free to pay more than is specified in the contract, and many choose to do so. 
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to measure the size of the gap between 
actual wages and contractual wages. Published statistics on actual and contrac- 
tual wages are not comparable either conceptually or with respect to the skill 
groupings employed. ”  One recent employer survey that asked directly about 
this gap concluded that only about 15 percent of employers paid exactly the 
negotiated rate, while on average actual pay  exceeded negotiated pay by  14 
percent (Brandes, Meyer, and Schudlich 1991). 
The fact that many employers choose to pay in excess of the negotiated rate 
does not imply, of course, that the terms of the collective agreement have no 
effect on  what  these employers pay.  At  least  some employers deliberately 
choose to pay in excess of the negotiated rate as part of a “high-wage” policy; 
increases in the negotiated rate of  pay  are likely to lead these employers to 
raise their pay rates as well, even though they are not bound to do so. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that payments in excess of  the negotiated wage are 
much more common for highly skilled workers than for workers at the bottom 
of the skill ladder. 
In light of the importance of collective bargaining coupled with the solida- 
ristic wage policy of unions, we would expect that any pressures toward greater 
wage inequality would be muted in Germany. Our finding that wage inequality 
in Germany did not grow during the  1980s is thus consistent with what an 
examination of German wage-setting institutions would have led one to expect. 
The finding that differences in earnings at the bottom of the wage distribution 
declined during this period while differences in earnings at the top of the distri- 
bution were more stable is also consistent with the structure of German wage- 
setting institutions, insofar as contractual wage floors are more likely to have 
been binding for the less skilled groups whose relative market wages we might 
have expected to have fallen. 
11.2.2  Demand and Supply 
Many researchers have  suggested that shifts in the industrial composition 
of employment have contributed to the growth in earnings differentials across 
education groups in the United States. In particular, it is argued that the decline 
of manufacturing has resulted in the loss of  many high-paying jobs for low- 
skilled workers. Table  11.7 shows the distribution of  employment by  broad 
17. The most important conceptual difference between the two sorts of  numbers is that the 
actual pay statistics include payments for overtime as well as other special payments, whereas the 
contractual pay statistics refer only to the hourly rate for a set of jobs. 389  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
Table 11.7  Distribution of  Employment by Industry (%) 
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Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 1969-1989 (Paris, 1991). 
sector in 1969, 1979, and 1989 for Germany and the United States. Although 
the manufacturing sector is relatively more important in Germany than in the 
United States, the two countries have experienced comparable declines in the 
manufacturing sector’s share of  employment. Similarly, both countries have 
experienced large relative increases in service-sector employment, particularly 
employment in finance, insurance, real estate, and business services, and in 
community, social, and personal services. 
To assess more formally the effects of changes in the industrial mix of em- 
ployment on the demand for workers by  education level, we constructed an 
index of demand using a shift-share analysis like that in Freeman (1975). Con- 
struction of  this sort of  index requires information both on the educational 
composition of employment by sector for some base period and on changes in 
the sectoral composition of employment over time. We  used data from a spe- 
cial tabulation of  the 1985 Mikrozensus on the share of  workers in each of 
three education categories-those  who had graduated from a Hochschule or 
Fachhochschule, those with an occupational qualification, and those in a resid- 
ual  category including both persons with  no occupational qualification and 
persons not reporting their educational attainment-for  each of fifty-three sec- 390  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
tors of the economy. These proportions were then applied as weights to total 
annual employment in each of the fifty-three sectors over the period 1960-89 
to construct a derived demand for each category of worker for each year. Spe- 
cifically, this measure of demand for workers with education i in year t is calcu- 
lated as 
where j indexes the industry, wii is the proportion of workers in industry j with 
education i in the base year, and El, is total employment in industry j in year 
€.I8  Changes in this measure between any two years represent changes in the 
demand for a particular education group attributable to changes in the sectoral 
composition of employment. 
Table 11.8 reports the rate of growth in this measure of demand by education 
level over the period 1960-89  and various subperiods. In all periods, there has 
been much more rapid growth in demand stemming from industrial changes 
for Hochschule or Fuchhochschule graduates than for workers with an occupa- 
tional qualification; demand for workers with no occupational qualification has 
actually fallen. The differences in the rate of growth of  demand for the most 
educated and the least educated workers appear to have fallen somewhat from 
the 1970s to the 1980s.  Although these numbers should be taken as fairly rough 
approximations, a slowing of the relative growth in demand for more educated 
workers might help explain why earnings differentials widened slightly along 
certain dimensions between 1976 and 1983, then narrowed between 1983 and 
1989. 
The demand index numbers in table 11.8, of  course, capture only shifts in 
demand stemming from shifts in the industrial composition of  employment. 
Econometric work by  some researchers suggests that the introduction of new 
technology biased toward more highly educated workers is an important factor 
underlying the widening earnings differentials in the United States (Bound and 
Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992). It is difficult to get hard evidence at 
an aggregate level on the labor market effects of new technology. There is no 
obvious reason to believe, however, that either the rate of introduction of new 
technology or the nature of its bias has been significantly different in the Ger- 
man than in the U.S. economy. 
One hypothesis about the widening of wage differentials across age groups 
in the United States also relates to the changing industrial structure of employ- 
ment. Younger workers have been more adversely affected by  the shifting of 
18. Data on the proportion of workers by education level by industry came from Schoer (1986). 
868. Data on employment by  industry came from Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18:  Volks- 
wirtschajiliche Gesarntrechnungen, Reihe  S9: Ergebnisse fur Wirtschfsbereiche (Wiesbaden). 
We would have liked to have had information on the proportion of industry employment by educa- 
tion for a year closer to the start of our period, but we were unable to locate this information for 
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Table 11.8  Indices of Demand Growth by Education due to Changes in the 
Industrial Miu of Employment 
Hochschule and  Occupational  No Occupational 
Fuchhochschule Graduates  Qualification  Qualification 
1960-89  1.42  .25  -  .22 
1960-70  1.65  .23  -  .40 
1970-89  1.30  .26  -.12 
1970-80  1.55  .22  -  .28 
1980-89  1.03  .30  .05 
Note: The numbers reported are annual rates of growth in the demand for workers of the specified 
types attributable to changes in employment by industry using a shift-share analysis. Details are 
given in the text. 
employment from the high-paying manufacturing sector toward the low-paying 
service sector in the United  States. Owing to inverse seniority layoff  rules, 
particularly in union settings, and to laws against age discrimination in em- 
ployment, older workers enjoy greater job security than younger workers. In 
addition, young cohorts entering the workforce have found few vacancies in 
the high-paying manufacturing sector (see Levy and Murnane 1992, 1361). 
Although Germany experienced a similar shift of employment from manu- 
facturing to services, the effect on wage differentials across age groups likely 
was muted by wage-setting institutions, dismissal laws, and early retirement 
policies. Wage differentials across industries are much narrower in Germany 
than in the United States.I9 These relatively small interindustry wage differen- 
tials dampen the effect of  shifts in the industrial structure of employment on 
earnings inequality by age. Furthermore, German dismissal laws make it diffi- 
cult to lay off  younger as well as older workers. To hasten workforce reductions 
in the 1980s, many companies instituted early retirement programs that were 
subsidized by the German government. Thus, younger workers were somewhat 
more protected against shifts in the industrial structure of demand in Germany 
than in the United States. 
Trends in relative wages by skill group and by age are also likely to be af- 
fected by trends in the relative supply of workers of different types. There have 
been important changes in the German education system over the past twenty 
years, with an increasing number of students attending the higher secondary 
school tracks and an increasing number going on to university. In the early 
1950s, more than 70 percent  of  fourteen-year-old  students were enrolled in 
what would today be termed a Hauptschule; by the early 1980s, only about half 
of  secondary school students attended a Hauptschule,  with roughly a quarter 
attending a  Realschule  and  a  quarter  attending  a  Gymnasium. In  addition, 
19. This fact probably reflects strong unions in the German service sector. For documentation 
and a discussion of  German interindustry wage differentials, see Burda and Sachs (1987). 392  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
changes were introduced that made it easier for students in the Realschule track 
or even the Hauptschule track to switch to a Gymnasium or otherwise earn an 
Abitur (Hamilton 1990). Hochschule enrollments also grew dramatically dur- 
ing the 1970s and early 1980s,  reflecting both an increase in the share of young 
persons choosing to enroll and the growth in the size of the youth population 
(Hamilton 1990; Teichler and Sanyal 1982). These changes have  translated 
with  some lag into increases in the level of  educational attainment of  the 
working-age population. 
Tables 11.9 and 1  1.10 below present information on the supply of working- 
age Germans by education level over the period 1976-89.  Data on educational 
attainment for the entire population, the employed, the unemployed, and those 
not in  the labor force are collected for selected years in the annual German 
Microzensus, a household survey, and published by  the Statistisches Bunde- 
samt.20  Although tables 11.9 and 11.10 report only figures for the population 
as a whole, the same basic trends are apparent in figures based on employment 
and the labor force. 
Table  11.9 shows trends in the percentage of the German population aged 
twenty to sixty and aged twenty-five to thirty that followed each of the most 
important secondary education tracks. Because schooling tends to last longer 
in Germany than in the United States and German university or college stu- 
dents often do not graduate until they are aged twenty-five years or older, we 
selected twenty-five- to thirty-year-olds to represent new entrants to the labor 
force.21  Both for the population as a whole and for the new entrants, the per- 
centage who had attended Hauptschule, the lowest secondary school track, fell 
dramatically between  1976 and  1989, from 74.2 percent to 58.5 percent for 
the German population aged twenty to sixty and from 68.4 percent to 44.1 
percent for the population aged twenty-five to thirty. At the same time, the 
proportion of the population completing both ReaEschule, the technical voca- 
tional high school, and the Abitur, the entrance exams required for university 
attendance, rose dramatically. The growth in the proportion of the population 
with an Abitur reflects both the growing share of German youths in the Gymna- 
sium track and institutional changes in the German education system made in 
the  1970s that make this qualification more accessible to students in other 
tracks. From 1976 to 1989, the proportion of the working-age population as 
20. Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie  1: Bevolkerung und Enverbstatigkeit, Reihe 4.4.2:  Be- 
ruj Ausbildung  und Arbeitsbedingungen der Enverbstatigen (Wiesbaden). Data on a consistent 
basis are not available prior to 1976. 
21. Even among twenty-five- to thirty-year-olds. a significant share of those who have chosen 
to attend Fachhochschulen or Hochschulen have not yet completed their degrees. In 1980, e.g., 
10.2 percent of twenty-five- to thirty-year-olds had completed one of these degrees; by  1985, the 
percentage of the same cohort, now aged thirty to thirty-five, that had completed one of  the two 
degrees had risen to 14.2 percent. None of our qualitative conclusions concerning trends in educa- 
tional  attainment is affected, however, by  the decision to treat twenty-five- to  thirty-year-olds, 
rather than thirty- to thirty-five-year-olds, as the new entrant group. 393  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
Table 11.9  Percentage of the German Working-Age Population by General 
Education 'hack Completed 
Gymnasium/ 
Hauptschule  Realschule  Abitur 
Aged 20-60 
1976  74.2  15.4  9.7 
1977  73.0  15.6  10.2 
1980  71.9  15.5  12.1 
1982  69.2  17.3  12.8 
1985  64.1  19.1  15.6 
1987  62.0  20.2  16.6 
1989  58.5  21.7  18.7 
Relative changes" 
1976-89  -1.8  2.6  5.0 
1976-82  -1.2  I .9  4.6 
1982-89  -2.3  3.2  5.4 
Aged 25-30 
1976  68.4  17.4  13.5 
1978  66.0  17.8  14.8 
1980  62.8  18.2  18.6 
1982  57.5  21.0  20.9 
1985  50.9  23.6  24.5 
1987  48.3  25.9  24.9 
1989  44.1  27.9  27.1 
Relative changes" 
1976-89  -3.4  3.6  5.4 
1976-82  -2.9  3.1  7.3 
1982-89  -3.8  4.1  3.7 
Note: Figures are authors' calculations based on German Microzensus data. 
Calculated as the log difference in the percentages divided by the number of  years in the period. 
This number equals the rate of growth in the population with a particular educational attainment 
less the rate of growth in the total population. 
well  as the population aged  twenty-five  to  thirty  with  an Abitur  roughly 
doubled. 
Table 11.10 shows trends in the population classified by their highest occu- 
pational qualification. The omitted category in this table includes those with 
no occupational  qualification as well as those who did not respond to the ques- 
tion,**  The percentage of the population in almost all the occupation-education 
categories has grown. Particularly notable is the expansion of  the percentage 
receiving vocational training (typically an apprenticeship). 
Overall trends in the supply of  workers by education level have been similar 
in Germany and the United States, in the sense that in both countries the supply 
22. According to numbers presented in Clement, Tessaring, and Weisshuhn (1980), nonrespon- 
dents represented about 20 percent of  the residual category in  1976. 394  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
Table 11.10  Percentage of the German Working-Age Population by Vocational or 
University Training 
Vocational  Technical School  Fachhochschule  Hochschule 
Training  Degree  Degree  Degree  Sum 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (A)-@) 
Aged 20-60 
1976  49.7  5.3  1.9  4.1  61.0 
1978  50.7  5.3  2.1  4.4  62.5 
1980  ...  5.9  2.5  4.8  ... 
1982  52.8  5.6  2.4  5.0  65.8 
1985  53.3  6.2  2.9  5.4  67.8 
1987  54.5  6.0  3.1  5.6  69.2 
1989  56.3  6.5  3.2  6.2  72.2 
Relative changes" 
1976-89  1  .o  1.6  4.0  3.2  I .3 
1976-82  1 .o  .9  3.9  3.3  1.3 
1982-89  .9  2.1  4.1  3.1  1.3 
Aged 25-30 
1976  55.8  4.8  2.5  5.7  68.8 
1978  56.5  5.0  2.6  6.2  70.3 
1980  ...  5.8  3.2  7.0  ... 
1982  58.3  4.9  3.3  6.9  73.4 
1985  58.8  5.6  3.7  6.1  74.2 
1987  60.3  5.2  3.7  5.4  74.6 
1989  61.6  5.1  3.5  5.4  76.2 
Relative changes' 
1976-89  .8  I .3  2.6  -  .4  .8 
1976-82  .7  .3  4.6  3.2  1.1 
1982-89  .8  2.2  .8  -3.5  .5 
Note: Figures are author's calculations based on German Microzensus data. 
Calculated as the log difference in the percentages (multiplied by  100) divided by the number of 
years in the period. This number equals the rate of growth in the population with  a particular 
educational attainment less the rate of growth in the total population. 
of more educated workers has risen dramatically relative to the supply of work- 
ers without  any  occupational  qualification  (in  Germany)  or with twelve  or 
fewer years of schooling (in the United States). Katz and Murphy (1992), how- 
ever, have argued that the deceleration in the growth of  the highly educated 
labor supply in the United States in the 1980s may explain the rise in returns 
to education in the  1980s. If, as Katz and Murphy hypothesize, the relative 
demand for more highly educated workers has shifted out steadily over time, 
this deceleration in the growth of the highly educated labor supply may explain 
why returns to education fell during the  1970s in the United States but grew 
during the 1980s. 
Tables 11.9 and 11-10  also present rates of growth of the German population 
by educational attainment over the period  1976-89  and over the subperiods 
1976-82  and 1982-89.  Looking first at the trends in secondary education re- 395  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
ported in table 11.9, one can see that the growth in the relative supply of work- 
ers graduating from the higher tracks has accelerated over time, in contrast to 
the situation in the United States. Because the type of secondary school that a 
person attends is imperfectly related to the occupational qualification ulti- 
mately obtained, figures on occupational qualifications arguably are more rele- 
vant. These figures, which are reported in table 11.10, tell a somewhat different 
story. There was an acceleration in the growth of the relative supply of persons 
with certain vocational qualifications but a deceleration in the growth of the 
relative supply of persons with others. The last column in table 11.10 shows 
the percentage of  the population with  any  vocational qualification. For the 
working-age population overall, there has been no change in the rate of growth 
of the relative supply of workers with some vocational qualification. 
Clearly, differences in the trends in educational earnings differentials in Ger- 
many and the United States may be consistent with a simple demand and sup- 
ply story, if the magnitudes of the shifts in the relative demand and supply of 
more highly educated workers in the two countries differ in the appropriate 
fashion. One hypothesis concerning the different trends in education differen- 
tials in the two countries during the 1980s is that relatively more rapid growth 
in the supply of  more educated workers in Germany, together with slower or 
comparable growth in the demand for more highly educated individuals, has 
resulted in some narrowing of earnings differentials there, while slower supply 
growth and comparable or more rapid demand growth in the United States has 
resulted in  a  widening of  earnings differentials. Although this  hypothesis 
seems generally consistent with the available evidence, we cannot conclusively 
identify differences in the magnitude of the relevant demand and supply shifts. 
It is more difficult to tell a similar story concerning the contrasting trends in 
by-age-group differentials in Germany and the United States. Given that the 
share of  young workers was falling in the United States during the 1980s, it 
seems reasonable to interpret the increases in age-related earnings differentials 
Table 11.11  Percentage of the German Working-Age Population by Age Group 
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there  as the consequence of  demand-side forces. The German baby  boom 
lagged that in the United States by  almost a decade. Table 11.11 reports the 
share of the German population by age group for the years 1970-89. The share 
of the German population aged twenty to twenty-nine rose steadily beginning 
in the mid-l970s, with most of the growth observed in the mid- to late-1980s. 
A similar pattern is observed in data for the labor force. One would think that 
this growth in the relative supply of young workers should have reinforced the 
effects of any relative demand shifts favoring more experienced workers, lead- 
ing to large increases in age-related earnings differentials during the  1980s. 
Instead, as was documented earlier, age-related earnings differentials appear, 
if anything, to have narrowed during this period. 
11.2.3 
A final possible explanation for the stability of relative wages in Germany 
lies with  that  country’s unique system of  apprenticeship training,  which is 
widely credited with providing German industry  with a highly  skilled and 
flexible workforce. Companies recruit apprentices at age sixteen or seventeen 
and train them for two to three years. About two-thirds of  all teenagers cur- 
rently participate in the system (Munch 1991,41). Apprenticeships are offered 
in all sectors of the economy, in white-collar as well as blue-collar jobs. 
Apprenticeship training in Germany is often referred to as the dud  system 
because apprentices receive both on-the-job and classroom training. The sys- 
tem is jointly managed by  the employers’ associations,  the unions,  and the 
government. Apprentices must pass written and oral examinations. To maintain 
uniform standards, the cumculum for a particular apprenticeship is set at the 
federal level, and examinations are conducted by local industry chambers. The 
dual system emphasizes general training that is intended to provide the founda- 
tion for a career in an occupation. Observers of the system also have stressed 
that it socializes teenagers to a working environment, teaching them the impor- 
tance of punctuality and reliability. 
The cost of apprenticeship training is shared by companies and by the state 
and federal governments. Large companies often supplement apprenticeship 
training in state-supported vocational schools with their own classroom train- 
ing. State governments typically help support the cost of in-class training pro- 
vided by companies. Smaller companies often send apprentices to training cen- 
ters that are jointly funded by  local chambers of  commerce and the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Science. The relatively high degree of coordination 
between employers and the government associated with the apprenticeship sys- 
tem makes it possible to adjust the mix of apprenticeships offered as the rela- 
tive demand for different types of workers changes. 
There is a consensus among German trade unions and employers that the 
apprenticeship system is important for maintaining German industry’s compet- 
itiveness in world markets. Germany is highly dependent on exports; during 
the early 1980s, about a third of output in the manufacturing sector was ex- 
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ported. Because its workforce is highly paid, Germany relies on “quality rather 
than price-competitive products, and. . . [thus needs] a highly skilled and reli- 
able work force as well as a cooperative relationship between management and 
labour on the shop floor” (Streeck 1987,5). 
Some observers have also argued that, because apprenticeship programs are 
designed to provide a workforce that possesses a broad set of skills, they pro- 
vide an important degree of labor flexibility to employers, facilitating the rede- 
ployment of workers within the company to accommodate changes in demand. 
By the same token, the broad general training received by the majority of Ger- 
man workers should facilitate the substitutability of different groups of work- 
ers. Because workers lacking a college degree nonetheless have received exten- 
sive  general  training,  they  may  be  more  readily  substitutable  for  college 
graduates in the production process than is true of U.S. workers who lack a 
college education. In addition, because new entrants to the labor market typi- 
cally have received intensive on-the-job training during their first two to three 
years of work, they may be better  substitutes for more experienced  workers 
than is true of new entrants to the U.S. labor market. The German apprentice- 
ship system thus might well have the effect of muting the effects of shifts in 
relative demand on relative wages across both education and age groups. 
11.2.4 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion concerning the relative 
importance of each of the influences just described. Data on relative unemploy- 
ment rates by education and age group should be of  some value for this pur- 
pose. If German wage-setting institutions have compressed wage differentials 
and limited their responsiveness to changes in the relative demand for workers 
of different types, one would expect to observe an increase in the relative un- 
employment rates of less educated and younger workers. In contrast, if relative 
wages have been fairly stable in Germany either because demand and supply 
for workers  of  different types have moved in tandem or because workers of 
different types are readily substituted for one another, we would not expect the 
relative unemployment rates of less educated or younger workers to have risen 
disproportionately during the 1980~.*~ 
Table 1  I.  12 presents evidence on whether less skilled workers have experi- 
enced a  disproportionate  increase  in  their  unemployment  rates.  The table 
shows the evolution of unemployment rates for workers in five education cate- 
gories over the period from 1976 to 1989, constructed from the Mikrozensus 
data on employment  and unemployment  by  level of  educational  attainment 
described earlier in the paper. The period covered by these data was generally 
one of rising unemployment. While unemployment rates for all groups rose, 
Distinguishing among the Competing Explanations 
23. Soltwedel et al. (1990) are among those advancing the argument that relative wage rigidities 
have contributed to excessive unemployment in Germany, although others, such as Franz (1987). 
have argued that the structure of relative wages is unlikely to be responsible for the growth in 
unemployment in Germany during the 1980s. Table 11.12  Unemployment Rates by Educational Group 
Gymnasium/  No Qualification/ 




School  Fachhochschule  Hochschule 
Degree  Degree  Degree 
1976  3.7  2.7  2.8  5.1 
1977  3.6  2.4  2.6  5.3 
1980  2.9  1.9  2.2  8.2 
1982  5.9  3.8  4.6  8.5 
1985  9.0  6.  I  6.9  13.1 
1987  9.3  5.5  5.8  12.7 








1.9  2.8  1.7 
1.4  2.1  1.4 
1.4  1.5  1.6 
2.3  3.0  3.0 
3.3  4.4  4.9 
3.6  4.2  4.3 
3.6  4.0  4.8 
Note: All unemployment rates were calculated using information on employment and unemployment by level of educational attainment based on the German Mikro- 
zensus and published by the Statistisches Bundesamt. 
aThe “no qualification” category includes persons who did not answer the Mikrozensus question concerning their level of educational attainment. 399  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
those for the least well qualified rose substantially more in absolute terms and 
typically somewhat more in relative terms as well. Between 1976 and  1987, 
for example, the unemployment rate for Huuptschule  graduates rose by  5.6 
percentage points (a 250 percent increase), while that for persons with an Abi- 
tur rose by only 3.0 percentage points (a 207 percent increase). Over the same 
period, the unemployment rate of persons in the no qualificatiodno response 
group grew by  7.6 points (a 249 percent increase), while that for all persons 
with an occupational or educational credential rose by  3.6 percentage points 
(a 233 percent increase). 
The data in table 11.12 are consistent with the hypothesis that the German 
wage-setting process prevented the relative wages of the least-skilled workers 
from falling to the level that  would have  been  dictated by  market forces, 
thereby increasing the gap between their unemployment rates and those of 
more highly skilled workers. Examination of trends in relative unemployment 
rates in the United States, however, suggests that differences in wage-setting 
institutions cannot fully explain the different German and U.S. trends in eam- 
ings inequality. Relative wages in the United States generally are considered 
to be highly responsive to changes in market conditions, yet an increase in the 
relative unemployment rates of less educated workers has been observed there 
as well. Overall unemployment in the United States fell slightly between 1979 
and  1989 from 5.8 to 5.3 percent. Over this period, however, the unemploy- 
ment rate for persons with less than a high school education rose from 8.9 to 
10.0 percent while that for those with some college fell from 4.8 to 4.3 percent 
and that for college graduates fell from 2.6 to 2.4 percent.%  The similarity of 
movements in relative unemployment rates in Germany and the United States 
leads us to believe that the stability of  the German wage structure reflects a 
better matching of  demand and supply andor the more ready substitution of 
different types of  workers in the production process in addition to any con- 
straints imposed by the German wage-setting process. 
Table 11.13 depicts trends in unemployment rates by age in Germany. If the 
demand for more experienced, and hence older, workers has increased relative 
to that for inexperienced, younger workers, and if German wage-setting institu- 
tions limit the responsiveness of  wages to changes in relative demand, we 
would expect, all else the same, that the unemployment rate of younger work- 
ers would have risen relative to that of older workers. The same outcome also 
would be expected if  younger workers in Germany have been disproportion- 
ately affected by  the decline in employment in manufacturing and wages in 
service have been insufficiently flexible to absorb the influx of workers looking 
for employment there.25 
24. The overall US.  unemployment rates cited for  1979 and  1989 are  official statistics. The 
unemployment rates by  education level  were calculated using files from the  outgoing rotation 
groups of the Current Population Survey. 
25. Burda and Sachs (1987) expound the hypothesis that the rise in the overall unemployment 
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Table 11.13  Unemployment Rates by Age Group 
15-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-55  55-60  6C+ 
1976  7.1  4.7  2.8  2.6  2.6  3.4  1.8 
1978  6.4  4.5  3.0  2.5  2.6  3.3  1.5 
1980  4.9  3.5  2.4  1.9  2.0  3.2  2.0 
1982  9.1  7.6  5.0  3.8  3.9  5.2  3.5 
1985  12.8  10.5  8.0  6.0  6.1  8.5  3.3 
1987  10.0  9.3  8.0  6.6  6.9  9.9  4.9 
1989  8.1  7.4  7.3  5.8  6.1  11.7  5.7 
Note: All unemployment rates were calculated using information on employment and unemploy- 
ment by age based on the German Microzensus and published by the Statistisches Bundesamt. 
The figures in table 1  1.13, however, show that, while young German workers 
have  experienced  substantial  increases  in  unemployment,  German workers 
over age fifty-five have experienced much larger absolute and relative unem- 
ployment rate increases. Although the pattern provides no support for the hy- 
pothesis that unresponsive wage-setting institutions are the principal reason for 
the absence of growing differentials in earnings across age groups in Germany, 
the large increase in the unemployment rate for workers aged fifty-five to sixty 
relative to that for younger workers largely can be explained by another institu- 
tional factor. Under German law, older workers are allowed to collect unem- 
ployment benefits for an extended period of time, and, if they have been unem- 
ployed for at least fifty-two weeks out of  the last year and a half, they can 
retire at age sixty and receive a government pension. Thus, many companies 
officially fired workers in their late fifties, providing them with supplemental 
benefits, in order to use the unemployment insurance system to help fund early 
retirement schemes.26 
11.3  Conclusion 
Since the mid-l970s, earnings inequality has fallen in Germany. Evidence 
from German social security data and the German Socioeconomic Panel data 
show that earnings differentials overall have narrowed, particularly in the bot- 
tom half of the distribution. While occupation differentials have risen slightly, 
26. We discuss the use of the German unemployment insurance system to subsidize early retire- 
ment programs at greater length in Abraham and Houseman (1993). We have also examined trends 
in German unemployment rates by education level by age. These figures show that, within nar- 
rowly defined age groups, the unemployment rate of less educated workers has risen relative to 
that of more highly educated workers. In addition, the unemployment rate of older workers relative 
to that of younger workers has risen primarily among those who are less educated. Finally, we have 
analyzed trends in the employmentlpopulation ratio by level of education and age for Germany and 
the United States. Trends in the employmentlpopulation ratio reflect trends in both unemployment 
and labor force participation. Our analysis of employmentlpopulation ratios leads to conclusions 
consistent with those drawn from our analysis of unemployment rates. 401  Earnings Inequality in Germany 
differentials across education groups have  remained relatively constant, and 
differentials in earnings by  age group generally have remained stable or nar- 
rowed. 
These trends in Germany stand in  striking contrast to trends in earnings 
inequality in the United  States. One potential explanation for the different 
trends in the two countries rests on differences in wage-setting institutions. 
German wage setting is far more centralized than that in the United States. 
Moreover, German unions have fought for a narrowing of wage differentials or 
at least for uniform percentage wage increases for all workers. Thus, even dur- 
ing periods when there were market pressures to widen wage differentials, one 
might still observe stable or even narrowing earnings differentials in Germany. 
The growing relative unemployment rate of  workers with  no  occupational 
qualification is consistent with this interpretation, but the fact that similar in- 
creases in the relative unemployment rates of less educated workers have been 
observed in the United States suggests that other factors contributed to the 
different trends in the two countries. In addition, there is no strong indication 
that the unemployment rates of  younger German workers have risen  espe- 
cially rapidly. 
A second potential explanation for the different German and U.S. trends in 
earnings inequality is that demand and supply conditions in the two countries 
have differed. In both countries, the demand for more educated workers has 
been increasing over time, but so too has the supply of more educated workers. 
In  Germany, however, the increase in the relative supply of  more educated 
workers accelerated or at least remained stable during the  1980s, while the 
growth in the relative supply of  more educated workers in the United States 
slowed considerably. Assuming that the relative demand for more educated 
workers has not grown more rapidly in Germany, these differences in the rela- 
tive supply of more educated workers may help explain the widely divergent 
trends in earnings inequality in Germany and the United States. The timing of 
the German baby boom, however, makes it more difficult to tell a demand and 
supply story about the behavior of  age-related earnings differentials in Ger- 
many during the 1980s. 
A final, and related, explanation for the stability of  the German earnings 
distribution is that the German education and training system simply does a 
better job of  supplying workers with an appropriate mix of skills. This might 
be true both because employers have  more direct influence over the kind of 
training received by new entrants to the labor market and because apprentice- 
ship training gives German workers a good general foundation that makes it 
easier for them to learn new tasks so that workers with different backgrounds 
are more easily substitutable for one another. 
On the whole, the different development of wage inequality in Germany and 
the United States cannot be readily attributed to the existence of fundamentally 
different demand and supply side forces in the two countries, although we 
should stress that the evidence on this point is far from conclusive. Rather, it 402  Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
appears that institutional factors played an important role in mitigating pres- 
sures for greater wage inequality in Germany. German wage-setting institu- 
tions probably have helped limit increases in earnings inequality. Moreover, 
the German education and training system, which many believe provides a 
better match between demand and supply than the U.S. system, likely has les- 
sened the downward pressures on wages for less educated, younger workers. 
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